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Currentlitigationof claims against an entire industry,or its dominant
members,has resultedin importantdevelopmentsin productliabilitylaw
that,in turn,raisesubstantialimplicationsformarketing.The mosthighly
(DES),a
publicizedand criticallyanalyzedcases involvediethylstilbestrol
for
1945
1971
women
and
between
syntheticestrogenfrequentlyprescribed
to preventmiscarriagesandotheraccidentsof pregnancy[Sindellv. Abbott
Labs1980,Paytonv. AbbottLabs1979,Reedand Davison1982].Similar
litigationhas occurredor is pendingwith regardto asbestos[Insurancev.
Forty-Eight 1980, Newsweek 1982, Wall Street Journal 1983], insulation
[Davis v. Yearwood1980], aluminum wiring [BeverleyHills 1979], leaded
paint [U.S. News& WorldReport1982],herbicidesand pesticides [Business

Week1984,Newsweek
1984,Time1984],andfoodadditivessuchas nitrates
and nitrites.
The commonfactorin all of thesecasesis the exceptionallylonglapseof
timebetweenproductuse andresultantinjuries,makingit verydifficultfor
madethe defectiveproduct.
the plaintiffto provewhich manufacturer(s)
Given this problemof proof,the CaliforniaSupremeCourtdevelopeda
theoryof recovery,calledmarketshareliability,in which DES manufacturers were held liable for damagesaccordingto their relativemarket
shares[Sindellv. AbbottLabs1980].Marketshareliabilityis the mostrecent
developmentin the area of intra-industryjoint liabilityin which several
firms in an industryare sued simultaneously.
The adoptionof a marketshareliabilityapproachmay,however,leadto
seriousproblemsas it is appliedto currentcases.Inaddition,therekindling
of interestin intra-industry
jointliabilitybecauseof Sindellhas resultedin
of
the reexamination earliertheoriesof joint liabilityby legal scholars
[Leibman1983,1984,LaMarca1982,Dworkin1981a,HLR1980,Sheiner
1978].In spite of havingbeen developedseveralyears ago [Steffen1965,
Harperand James 1956],these other theoriesof recoveryfrom multiple
defendantshavenotbeenadequatelystudiedfroma marketingperspective.
Hence,this article first considersthe natureof the DES situationto
joint liabilityclaim.
presentthe importantelementsof an intra-industry
Next, all of the approachesto jointliabilityarereviewedin the contextof
DES and other relatedcases. Finally,the implicationsof marketshare
liabilityfor marketingare discussed.
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Anestimatedone-halfto two millionwomentookDESbetween1947,when
the FoodandDrugAdministration
(FDA)approvedits use forpreventionof
accidentsrelatedto pregnancy,and1971,whentheFDAwithdrewapproval
for use by pregnantwomen.As manyas fourmillionfemaleoffspringwere
exposedto DES [Henderson1980,p. 143].The FDAcategorizedDES as
experimentaland requiredit to be so labeledwhen distributed[Dworkin
1981b,p. 77].
AlthoughDES was consideredbothsafe and effectiveat the timeof its
introduction,medicalresearcherssubsequentlydiscoveredthatdaughters
of DES users had an unusuallyhigh incidenceof precancerous
condition
and rare forms of cancer.Nor was DES shown to be effectivefor the
preventionof miscarriages.
Somewherebetween94 and300 companiesproducedDESduringthe20
years priorto the discoveryof the drug'sadverseconsequences[Sheiner
1978,p. 964].No firm helda patenton DES becauseit was a generically
marketedproduct,and pharmacistscould fill prescriptionswith the
productof any manufacturer[Paytonv. AbbottLabs1979].Manyof these
firmssoldDESforusesotherthan,orin additionto,accidentsofpregnancy.
DES continuesto be prescribedfor a numberof health-related
problems.
The abovefactorscombineto createuniqueproblemsfor DESplaintiffs
whoseekrecoveryin productliabilitylitigation.Whenmorethan100firms
have marketeda productwhich may havecausedinjurieswhich become
apparentonly after 10 to 20 yearsfollowingplaintiffs'prenatalexposure,
there are difficultproblemsregardingproofof facts. Morespecifically,a
plaintiffwillencounterdifficultyin attemptingto identify,perhaps25years
after her motherhad consumedthe product,which pharmaceutical
firm
manufacturedthe drugthat causedher injuries.
All of these considerationsrelate to the issue of intra-industryjoint
liability:underwhat conditionsmay a plaintiffsue an entireindustry,or
the majormembersthereof,to assess liabilityfora defectiveproductwhose
exact originis unknown[Kroll1979,p. 193]?Industry-wideliabilitywas
conceivedinitiallyas a techniqueforapportioning
damagesamongseveral
defendants,but only after a plaintiffhad proventhem all to be liable.
However,recentdecisionshave begunto use industry-wideliabilityas a
meansof assisting the plaintiffto demonstrateliability[Abelv. Eli Lilly
1980,p. 31, Sindellv. AbbottLabs1980,pp.614-22].The resultantblurring
of the damageapportionment
andliabilityassessmentfunctionscancreate
considerableconfusion.
Such problemsand disorderhave led DES plaintiffsto attemptnovel
applicationsof traditionalapproachesto tort recoveryandto proposenew
argumentsuponwhichto baseclaimsof jointliability[Minkv. University
1978,Morrissyv. Eli Lilly1979,Katzv. Eli Lilly1979].Somecourtshave
respondedby stretchingthe doctrinesof alternativeliabilityandconcertof
action in orderto help plaintiffs overcometheir problemsof proof[Abelv. Eli
Lilly 1980, Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly 1980]. Others have heard a variety of
arguments on behalf of an enterprise liability approach[Sindell v. Abbott
Labs 1980, Abel v. Eli Lilly 1980]. And Californiahas opted for a market
share basis for recovery [Sindell v. AbbottLabs 1980]. These four intraindustry theories of recovery are now described in detail.

Approaches to Joint
Liability

Traditionalapproaches
tojointtortliabilityincludealternativeliabilityand
concertof action.At leastone courthas heldthat DESplaintiffscan bring
actionsundereitherof these theories[Abelv. Eli Lilly1980].
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AlternativeLiability Aplaintiffseekingtoestablishjointliabilityunderalternativeliabilitymust
showthatall defendantsbehavedwrongfully,eventhoughonlyonecaused
the injury[Restatement
1965,433B, commentf]. If theplaintiffprovesthis,
then to escapeliabilityany one defendantmustshowthat he didnotcause
the injury [Ybarrav. Spangard1944].The classic case in this area is
Summersv. Tice [1948],in which two hunters negligentlyshot in the
directionof a thirdman,therebyinjuringhim.Eachdefendantwas forcedto
try to show that his weaponhad not causedthe plaintiff'swound.
A courtwill notfindjointliabilityunderalternativeliabilitywherenotall
defendantshave beenprovennegligent[Wetzelv. Eaton1973].So when a
fencersufferedan eye injuryas theresultofa defectivesabremanufactured
byoneof twodefendants,his actionfailedwhenhecouldnotprovethatboth
had actednegligently[Garciav. Joseph1978].Likewise,the courtrejected
the plaintiff'sargumentforanoutrightapplicationofalternativeliabilityin
200
Sindellbecausethe plaintiffhad namedonly 11 of the approximately
Abbott
DES[Sindellv.
firmswhichmighthaveproducedthe injury-causing
Labs1980,p. 602].
Concertof Action Concertof action offers a second possibleapproachto establish intraindustryjointliability.Underthis theory,allthosepursuinga commonplan
ordesignto commita harmfulact who(a)activelytakepartin it, (b)further
to thewrongdoer,
orrequest,(c)lendaidorencouragement
it bycooperation
actsdonefortheirbenefitareequally
or(d)ratifyandadoptthewrongdoer's
liable[Prosser1971,p. 592].
Althoughdrag races are the most frequentlymentionedexamplesof
v. Rogers1968],it could apply to product
concertedaction [Bierczynski
liabilitysuits wherethe plaintiffcan cite parallelactionsby defendantsin
orderto makeinferencesof a planortacitagreement[Orserv. George
1967].
Such actionsmightincludemanufacturinga productto commondesigns
activitieswithregardto productsafetyand
andspecification,industry-wide
warnings,andothercommonefforts,perhapsthrougha tradeassociation,
such as lobbying.At least one court has maintained,however,that a
plaintiffmustdemonstratesome"jointcontroloftherisk"bydefendantsto
provejointcontrol[Hallv. DuPont1972,p. 37].Althoughthe plaintiffneed
not establisha formaljointventureon the partof the defendantsto prove
joint control[Connorv. GreatWestern1968],evidenceof sharedresearch,
jointtestingof products,andjointlegislativelobbyingortradeassociation
shouldbe providedat the very least.
As with an assertionof alternativeliability,concertedactionon the part
of the defendantsshifts the burdenof proofto them. In orderto evade
liability,any defendantmust provethat its actionswerenot connectedto
the plaintiff'sinjury.
In Sindellthe defendantswerechargedwith having(a)failedto test DES
adequately,(b) not providedsufficientwarnings,(c) relieduponthe tests
performedby one another,and (d) taken advantageof one another's
promotionand marketingtechniques.The court maintainedthat these
ora common
allegationsdidnot amountto a chargeof tacitunderstanding
plan. Further, it could not be established either that each defendant knew
the other's conduct was harmful to the plaintiff or that defendants had
helped or encouraged one another with regard to inadequate testing and
warning.
Enterprise Liability Experts who disagree with the extension of traditionaltheories of joint tort
liability to allow for industry-wideliability have proposedthat courts adopt
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the enterprise liability doctrine[Sheiner 1978;Podgers1980,Klemme1976].
This approachwould modify alternative liability in that a plaintiff would
have to prove a "high probability"that the injury resulted from unjust
behaviorby one of the defendants.As describedin one often-citedsource, the
specific elements of enterprise liability would be [Sheiner 1978, p. 995]:
1. Plaintiffis notat faultforhis inabilitytoidentifythecausativeagentandsuch
liabilityis dueto the natureof the defendant'sconduct.
2. A genericallysimilardefectiveproductwas manufactured
by all the defendants.
3. Plaintiff'sinjurywas causedby this productdefect.
4. The defendantoweda duty to the class of whichplaintiffwas a member.
5. Thereis clearandconvincingevidencethatplaintiff'sinjurywascausedbythe
productof someone of the defendants.Forexample,the joineddefendants
ofsuchdefectiveproductsonthemarketat the
accountedfora highpercentage
time of the plaintiff'sinjury.
6. There existed an insufficient,industry-widestandardof safety as to the
manufactureof this product.
7. All defendantswere tortfeasorssatisfyingthe requirementsof whichever
causeof actionis proposed:
strict liability,negligence,or warranty.
Defendants unable to provethat their productscould not have caused the
injury would pay damages accordingto their marketshares [Sheiner 1978,
p. 994]. The justification for this enterpriseliability basis for industry-wide
liability rests upon the following policy argument [Sheiner 1978, pp.
1002-4]:
Wherean entire industry,engagedin a predictablydangerousenterpriseand
followingsimilarsafetypractices,placesan identicallydefectiveproductin the
stream of commerce,the industryratherthan the individualmanufacturer
shouldbe the focalpointforliabilitybecauseit canbestallocaterisks,distribute
costs, andtake preventivemeasures.
In Hall v. DuPont [1972], six explosives manufacturers and their trade
association were held liable for injuries resulting from blasting cap
accidents. The court said that where individualmanufacturerscouldnot be
identified, the existence of industry-wide standards or practices could
support a finding of joint control of the risk, thereby shifting to each
defendant the burden of proving its product could not have injured the
plaintiffs. The question of whose blasting caps caused the harm became
secondary to the court's finding that defendantsengagedin joint control of
the risk. So in situations where a plaintiff cannot identify which defendant
manufacturedthe harmful productand each defendantis equally unable to
prove that its product did not cause the injury, liability will follow.
The Hall court took care, however, to place some limits on the possible
scope of its opinion [Hall v. DuPont 1972, p. 378]:
By noting these requirements,we wish to emphasizetheir specialapplicabilityto
industries composedof a small numberof units. What would be fair and feasible
with regard to an industry of five to ten producers might be manifestly
unreasonable if applied to a decentralizedindustry composedof thousands of
small producers.
The Sindell court, using Hall for guidance, declined to apply enterprise
liability to the DES situation for three reasons. First, at least 200 firms had
marketed DES during the period in question while the six companies in Hall
comprised virtually the entire blasting cap industry in the U.S. Second,
DES manufacturers had not jointly controlled the risk via trade associations. Last of all, the pervasive role of the FDA in setting criteria for testing
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and marketing drugs made it unfair to impose liability without proof
regarding who supplied the offending DES.
Market Share Liability The California Supreme Court, under the new doctrine it designated as
market share liability, sustained the Sindell plaintiff's cause of action by
adaptingthe alternative liability rule describedearlier[GLR1981,Landand
Melham 1981, Kroll 1980]. The market share approachto intra-industry
joint liability includes at least the followingelements [Sindellv. AbbottLabs
1980]:
1. Plaintiffssufferedinjurybecauseof a defectivelydesignedproductmarketed
by someunknownmanufacturer.
2. Plaintiff'sinabilityto identifythe specificmanufacturerarosethroughno
fault of his/herown.
in the industryproducedandmarketedthe sameproduct
3. All manufacturers
with an identicaldesigndefect.
4. Plaintiffjoinedas defendantsthosefirmswhichaccountedfor"asubstantial
shareof the market."
If a plaintiff can establish the aboveelements, each defendantmust then
try to show that it could not have been the source of the harmful product.
Since shifting this burden to defendants is tantamount to determining
whether plaintiffs or defendants will most probablyprevail, the court has
apparentlydecidedthat the costs of DES injuries should be shared by those
surviving DES producers whom plaintiffs can bring before a California
court. The court relied on the Summers rationale that, as between an
innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the latter should bearthe cost
of injury [Brahn 1980].
Additional policy-basedreasons offeredfor the Sindell decision included
the belief that defendants are better able to bear the cost of injury and that
manufacturers are in the best position to guard against defects and to
provide warnings; therefore, holding them liable for not adequately performingthose tasks providesan incentive for productsafety [Burch1982, p.
789]. The court also noted the desirability of fashioning new remedies to
meet the changing needs of a complex industrial society and corresponding
necessity of adapting the rule of causation and liability [Sindell v. Abbott
Labs 1980, pp. 601-11]. The court seemingly based its decision on policy
grounds rather than having deducedit as the inevitableoutcomeof applying
and extending existing legal doctrines to the DES problem.

Implications of Joint The court's general statement of the market share liability rule for the
Liability Litigation apportionmentof damages in DES cases creates several serious difficulties
for companies involved in such litigation. Moreover,implications for the
marketing system arise from the potential explosive growth in the area of
intra-industryjoint liability.

Difficulties in Applying As articulated by the court, the market share rule providesthat [Sindellv.
Market Share Liability AbbottLabs 1980, p. 612]:
Eachdefendantwill beheldliablefortheproportion
of thejudgmentrepresented
thatit couldnothavemadethe
byits shareof thatmarketunlessit demonstrates
productwhichcausedplaintiff'sinjuries....
Under this approach,each manufacturer'sliability would approximateits
responsibilityfor the injuriescausedby its own products.
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At the outset, this statementraises severalquestionsaboutthe appromarketshares
priatedefinitionof "marketshare."Becausemanufacturers'
probablyvariedbetween1947and1971,will differentmarketsharesapply
for differentplaintiffsaccordingto when their mothersused DES?Or
shouldan averagemarketsharebe calculatedfor the entireperiod?If so,
what aboutthe fact that manyfirms producedDES for only partof the
1947-to-1971period?
Marketshare issues also arise with respectto geographicarea.Which
marketfiguresapplyif a firmwitha largeshareofthenationalmarkethada
muchsmallersharewithinthestatewheretheplaintiff'smotherconsumed
the drug,or vice versa?This difficultyis compounded
if somecompanies
havegoneout of businessor operatebeyondthe reachof the courtswithin
the state tryingthe lawsuit.
The fact that severalmanufacturers
marketedDESfor uses otherthan
the preventionof accidentsof pregnancyfurthercomplicatesthe issue.
Measuringmarketsharesaccordingto the total volumeproducedor sold
could overstatethe liabilityof firms whose productwas used for other
purposes.
Additionalmarketsharecomputationproblemsmay occurif the plaintiffs bringpharmacistsanddrugwholesalersas defendantsin DESactions
The Sindelldecisionaddressesonlythedivision
alongwith manufacturers.
of liability on a horizontalbasis, i.e., among manufacturers.Vertical
allocations, i.e., among manufacturers,wholesalers,distributors,and
retailers,leadto morecomplexproblems.Forexample,a plaintiffmightjoin
as defendantsfourmanufacturers
with60 percentof industryoutput,three
wholesalershandling35 percentof the productwithin the state having
jurisdiction,anda chainstoreretailerthataccountedfor15percentofDES
sales throughoutthe state.Whilethe nonadditivenatureof marketshares
on a verticalbasisexplainsthe 110percent"total"marketsharefigure,it
still leavesthe courtwithouta marketsharerule in such cases.
In a similar vein, the lack of specificity as to what constitutes a
"substantialshareofthemarket"onthepartofDEScodefendants
maylead
to other questionableconsequences.Recoveryis permittedfrom several
defendants,eachof whommayaccountfora relativelysmallmarketshare,
as longas theircombinedsharesaredeemed"substantial."
The dissenting
opinionin Sindellexpressesseriousreservationsaboutthe equityof this
situation[Sindellv. AbbottLabs1980,pp. 615-16].
Implicationsfor The marketshareliabilityrule,totheextentthatit appliesto domesticdrug
Marketing manufacturers,makes the pharmaceuticalindustryan insurerof DEScausedinjuries.The resultingexposureis potentiallystaggering.OneNew
Yorkcourtentereda $500,000jury verdictfor a DES victimin an intraindustryjoint liabilitysuit [Bichlerv. Eli Lilly 1981].Whilenot all DES
casesmaybeworthone-halfmilliondollars,aboutfourmillionwomenwere
exposed to DES [Henderson1980, p. 143]. The implicationsof such
outcomes, or even the prospectof such outcomes,for marketingare
considerableand diverse.
NewProductDevelopmentThe extensionof liabilityfor injurieswhich surfacea generationafter
productuse and for whichcausationneednot be provengreatlyincreases
the financialrisk of introducingnew products.Onelikelyresponseto this
situationwill be moreelaborateandexpensivetestingprocedurespriorto
marketingsuch products.Further,duplicatetesting of new productsby
manufacturers
is likelyto occurto avoidthe possibilityof
pharmaceutical
"jointlycontrollingthe risk."
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An additionalimplicationis the inevitablerise in productliability
insurance
rates.Indeed,
inpredicting
involved
risks
giventheuncertainties
andexpected
lossesforthissortofliability,theriskmaybecome
unratable.
The relativelyunderdeveloped
state-of-the-art
of generational
testingof
foodanddrugproducts
furtherexacerbates
the insuranceproblem.
The net effectof thesecost-raising
factorswill be the tendencyof the
to
slow
pharmaceutical
industry
productdevelopment,
perhapseven
controversial
of
risks
because
the
involved.
Butthe
abandoning
products
of
market
shareliabilityextendswellbeyondthepharmapotentialimpact
ceuticalindustry.Consider
thisdoctrine
thepossibility
ofapplying
toother
suchasasbestos.
Asbestosis
andsimilarrespiratory
chemicals,
widely-used
diseasesincluding
tenormoreyearsafterthe
lungcancerbecomeapparent
initialexposureto the substance[Insurance
v. Forty-Eight
1980].Justas
with DES, the injuredpersonwill probablybe unableto identifythe
manufacturer
who produced
the offendingproduct.Or,as is
particular
morelikelytooccur,theworkermayhavebeenexposedtoasbestossupplied
by severalcompanies.
Shouldthemarketshareapproach
beextended
totheseasbestos-related
substantial
on
the
of
the
asbestosmanufacturers
injuries,
exposure
part
wouldresult.Over3,000different
contain
asbestos,rangingfrom
products
consumer
itemssuchas toothbrushes
andhairdryersto industrial
goods
such as asphaltandconcretewaterpipes.An estimatedeightto eleven
millionworkershavebeenexposedto asbestossinceWorldWarII began
1980,pp.860-66].Theindustryfacesat least5,000bodilyinjury
[Mansfield
distriincludemanufacturers,
productliabilitysuitsin whichdefendants
butors,andothersuppliers[Mansfield
1980,p. 865].
Lawsuitsarisingoutofuseofherbicides
to
manufactured
andpesticides
identicalformulas,leadedpaint,aluminumwiring[Beverley
Hills1979],
insulation[Davisv. Yearwood
1980]offersituationsin whichthe market
shareliabilitydoctrineseemsto fit. Delayedreactionsto any of these
arelikelytoleaveplaintiffs
ina position
where,throughnofaultof
products
theirown,theycannotconnecttheirinjurieswithonespecificproducer.
Genericlabelingof nondurable
provides
manyothersituations
products
in whichaninjuredpersonmaynotbeabletoidentifythefaultyproduct's
ifhe/shepurchased
versionsof
severalunbranded
manufacturer,
especially
their
theproduct.
which
feel
confident
that
posefewer
Companies
products
risksto buyers,perhapsbecauseof morethorough
testing,maydiscard
in an attempttolessentheirproduct
versionsof theirproducts
unbranded
viathemarketshareapproach
liabilityexposure
[LandandMelham1981,
pp. 45-46].
Overall,then, new productdevelopmentmaydeclinein manyindustries
whereproductsare similar,especiallyif distinctivebrandidentitieshave
not beenestablished.
ChannelIntegration The growth of market share liability litigationcould lead to greater
withinthe channelas well as attemptsby the mostvulnerable
cooperation
channelmembersto controlchanneloperations.Thus,thetendencytoward
vertical marketing systems [Kotler 1980, p. 425] is likely to be stimulated.

combinationswill be betterable
Fewer,largermanufacturer-distributor
to withstandthe financialimpactof intra-industry
jointliabilitylawsuits.
The economiesof such large-scaleoperationsmay even allow the participatingfirms to self-insureshouldintra-industryrisks becomeunratable.
Smallerfirmsunableto withstandthefinancialimpactofsucha suitwill be
either forced out of business or compelled to become members of
substantiallylargerdistributionchannels.
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Current problems experienced by a channel memberin seeking
indemnificationfromothermemberswill also lead to increasedchannel
integration. Eaton, the manufacturerin Wetzelv. Eaton [1973], an
alternativeliabilitycase,experienceddifficultyin identifyingwhichof two
componentparts suppliershad manufacturedthe partwhich had failed,
jointliabilitytheoriesof recovery
causingWetzel'sinjuries.Intra-industry
are usuallyinvokedwhen plaintiffshavenowayof identifyingthe specific
defendantwhoseproductcausedthe injuries.Butthecourtin Wetzelnoted
that Eaton clearly should have maintainedrecordsregardingwhich
v. Eaton1973,p.30].Thus,
componentsuppliermadethefaultypart[ Wetzel
even if they do not haverecords,manufacturers
maybe heldto havesuch
knowledge,preventingthem fromusingjointliabilitytheoriesto recover
from their suppliers[Summersv. Tice1948].As a result,manufacturers
may beginto monitorthe actionsof their suppliersmoreclosely,perhaps
demandingassurancesabout the quality of the suppliedcomponentor
assumingsomeof the testingand inspectingfunctions.
Research Both marketingtheoristsand practitionersshouldbeginto study a basic
Marketing-Law
jointliability:Howwill thedefinitionof a
questionrelatingtointra-industry
fungibleproductchangeas courts beginto considerconsumerbehavior
research?
This questionis actuallyone of perspective.Intra-industry
theoriesof
recoveryarerelevantwhenthe injury-causing
productcannotbetracedto a
as to its source.
particularcompany.Thus, the productis indistinguishable
If severalfirms use the samechemicalformulaor productionprocess,the
resultingproductsaresaidto befungible[Nolan1982].Buttheviewpointis
that of the manufacturer.
If courts begin to consider what products consumers regard as
substitutes(a market-related
definitionof fungible),moreproductscould
comeunderthe scopeof intra-industryliability[Dworkin1981a,p. 80].If
products'brandidentitiesarenot establishedandif a particularproductis
frombeingnamed,whileharming
destroyed,preventingthe manufacturer
a user, what will the courtsdo?Perhapsopinionpollswill show that this
productbelongs to a class of goods that consumersregardas being
undifferentiated.As consumer behaviorresearchgains acceptancein
productliabilitylitigation[MorganandAvrunin1981],the term"fungible"
could take on expandedmeaning,therebybroadeningthe scopeof intraindustryliability.
Summary The majorimplicationsfor marketingof the evolvingtrends in intraindustryjoint liabilityhave beenhighlighted.The legal implicationsand
problemshave necessarilybeen simplifiedbecause of their technical
complexityand lack of directrelevance.
All oftheissuesmentionedseemtopointtotheneedto balancethe injured
parties'rightsto recoverdamagesagainstthe defendants'concernsabout
maintainingthe extent of liability within reasonablebounds.Modern
andmarketingof increasingly
technologyhas broughtabouttheproduction
sophisticatedproductswhich can cause injuriesvia complex,unprecedentedprocessesthat may leave the injuredpartyunableto identifythe
specificcause of the harm.As a matterof socialpolicy,the law can allow
thoseinjuriesto be bornebythe partieswhichincurthemorit canallowfor
someformof compensationby fashioningcontemporary
rulesforrecovery
and
Zollers
Since
"the
market
is
the
ultimate
[Dworkin
1982].
laboratory,
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andthe consumeris the ultimatetest subject"[Wilson1980,p. 757],the
latteroptionseemsmuchmoreacceptable.
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